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BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND 
INVESTMENTS IN ANGOLA1




The change of presidency from Fernando Henrique Cardoso to Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva is understood as a turning point in the orientation of Bra-
zilian foreign policy (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007). During Lula’s mandate, 
Brazil experienced steadily increase of the flow of direct investments. In this 
context, Brazilian multinationals started operations and services provisions 
in developing countries. In Africa, Angola emerges as the main destination 
of Brazilian investments. The connections between foreign policy and firms’ 
internationalization are central to understand the recent pattern of the eco-
nomic activities of Brazilian companies in Angola. This paper argues that 
the internationalization strategies of Brazilian companies in the country are 
related to the movements of the Brazilian foreign policy. Therefore, we pos-
it the hypothesis that changes in foreign policy paradigm and government 
incentives have significant weight in the recent profile of Brazilian foreign 
direct investments. 
African countries are often considered as places of insecure political 
institutions for foreign direct investment (FDI) (MIGA/World Bank Group 
2013)4. However, many countries in these regions have undergone a process 
1  A first version of this paper has been presented at Brazilian International Relations Associa-
tion Conference (ABRI) 2015.
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4  One of the main political risk rankings can be found here: “Political Risk Index”
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of democratization in the 1970s, which resulted in more attractive environ-
ments for foreign investors (Pandya 2014). These processes, as a rule, incor-
porated social sectors in political institutions, also expanding the role of busi-
ness in the economy. Despite the growth of investments has accelerated since 
the 1990s in countries as South Africa, many others have not benefited from 
investment flows, much because of historical political instability, beyond the 
difficulties faced by economies (Asiedu 2002; Collier and Gunning 1999). 
Therefore, good relations with international sources of FDI are an important 
aspect of many African countries to foster development through international 
investments.
Brazil is a traditional receiver of foreign investment and only on the 
beginning of the XXI century became a significant foreigner investor in com-
parison with developed countries (Motta Veiga and Rios 2014; Fleury, Fleury, 
and Borini 2013). The first destinations of the Brazilian investments were 
Latin American countries, much due of the cultural proximity and similar so-
cioeconomic characteristics (Fleury, Fleury, and Borini 2013). In recent years, 
especially since the Lula’s government (2003-2010), Brazilian companies be-
gan to penetrate other regions and are now present in most countries (Arbix 
and Caseiro 2011), surpassing the boundaries of its neighbours. As we can 
see in the figure above, Brazilian foreign direct investments faced a dramatic 
growth since 2003. 
Figure 1: Evolution of Brazilian Foreign Direct Investments (2001 – 2014)
      
Source: the authors. Based on data from Brazilian Central Bank.
https://www.prsgroup.com/category/risk-index
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What make Brazilian investments go to the Global South? Some 
suggestions in literature arise the hypothesis that the shift in Brazilian 
foreign policy motivated by the end of bipolarity in the 1990s had the 
distinctive feature of strengthening South-South cooperation (Milani 
and Carvalho 2013; Souza 2012). This could mean also the increase 
in economic flows. If the change in the direction of Brazilian foreign 
policy is expressed by the quest to reduce its dependence on a few coun-
tries (mainly North) and by the greater autonomy of their choices in 
international matters (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007), may there be con-
sequences to Brazilian investors. 
As detailed by Milani and Carvalho (2013, 13), the first signals 
of Global South’s counterpoint to the North dominance can be traced 
back to the Bandung Conference, occurred in Indonesia in 1955. Since 
then, until the creation of the Brazilian Agency for Cooperation, many 
initiatives have been done by the Brazilian government to strength its 
position as a regional leader, not automatically aligned to traditional 
powers. This trend was revived in the 2000s, during the Lula’s govern-
ment, who sought to expand ties with the southern countries, through 
bilateral and multilateral mechanisms, as international institutions 
(Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007, 290). The promotion of investments 
and trade flows are some of the main instruments to strength bilateral 
relations and, in this sense, it is plausible to think this redirection in 
political terms may be related to the emerging pattern destination of 
Brazilian FDI.
Among the actions undertaken by the Brazilian government in 
the context of South-South cooperation, one that stands out most is 
the International Cooperation for Development (ICD)5. In the official 
discourse, it is characterized by the relationship’s horizontality between 
the donor and a partner in order to preserve the autonomy of the recipi-
ent country. It is characterized by the absence of conditionalities and by 
the understanding that development promotion mechanisms are im-
5  For the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), the International Technical Cooperation (term 
used by the Agency) comprises " financial aid, technical support, training of human resourc-
es, technology transfer process, donating equipment and materials, among other mechanism. 
They were - and still are - widely used in the operationalization of cooperation" (ABC). However 
the definition of ICD is still object of controversy (Souza 2012).
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portant to closer relations between countries6. According to Milhorance 
(2013), the Brazilian ICD has contributed to the increasing recognition 
of the confidence of countries in the southern hemisphere, especially 
in countries of Portuguese-speaking Africa (Lusophone Africa).
Even though fully justifiable though the lens of the foreign poli-
cy paradigms shift, Brazilian cooperation in Africa has been questioned 
due the lack of insularity of the initiatives in relation to national private 
interests (Duarte 2014). In the view of Souza (2012), the ICD granted 
by developing countries, like Brazil, is similar to that of OECD coun-
tries7. In the author’s view, “both are used as political and diplomatic 
instrument and promotion of economic interests, and are not intended 
exclusively or primarily for the development of partner countries or 
‘receptors ‘” (2012, 91). Similar point of view is proposed by Apolinário 
Junior (2014), who demonstrates how the Brazilian cooperation could 
be linked to the support gained by Brazil in the board of directors of 
important international financial institutions such as the IMF and the 
World Bank. 
Major recipients of cooperation for the Brazilian development 
in Africa, Lusophone African countries are also some of the most fre-
quent destinations of investment by Brazilian companies in the Conti-
nent. The foreign policy in direction to the South, in this regard, may be 
an important drive to the expansion of Brazilian multinationals towards 
the region. When comparing the practices of international cooperation 
of Brazil, India and China, André de Mello e Souza (2012), points out 
that the motivations of South-South cooperation are similar to those of-
fered by OECD countries. By conclusion, the author argue that it can be 
understood as a political-diplomatic instrument and, at the same time, 
and instrument to promote its economic interests (2012, 91).
Once Brazilian companies are diversifying their investment lo-
cation, this requires new explanations about what are the reasons for 
their choices. We hypothesized that the relationship between foreign 
policy and foreign direct investment is critical to understanding the 
role of policy on business decisions and the incentives for the interna-
tionalization of Brazilian companies. Among the possible new inter-
6  From the official website of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency. http://www.abc.gov.br/ 
7  This view is shared by Milani (2012).
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pretations, we argue that the type of relationship Brazil has with other 
countries, the support of the Brazilian government, cooperation agree-
ments and international political affinities are important instruments 
for the internationalization of Brazilian firms in Angola.
The proximity between states can affect the behaviour of inves-
tors by facilitating interactions between economic agents and thereby 
reduce information asymmetries, diminish risks of expropriation and 
favour investments (Gupta and Yu 2007)8. In the case of US invest-
ments abroad, there is evidence that the political proximity of the host 
countries with the US reduces entry barriers and costs for American 
business (2007, 05)9. Similarly, the proximity policy may also reduce 
seizure of risks. When evaluating Chinese investments, Duanmu 
(2014) argues that the magnitude of the risk to which these compa-
nies are submitted is associated with the strength of political relations 
between the Chinese government and the recipient countries. These 
explanatory mechanisms may also be true in the case of Brazilian in-
vestment in Angola.
Foreign policy is an important inductor of Brazilian investments 
in Africa. With the increasing volume of FDI in recent years and the 
expansion of state aid dedicated to them, the questions about the con-
nections between international business and politics gained relevance 
(Caseiro and Masiero 2014) . This article seeks to address this issue by 
providing information that contributes to the understanding that geo-
political interests expressed in Brazilian foreign policy may be linked to 
economic interests. The case of Angola is illustrative in this sense. The 
intricate relationship between international development cooperation, 
business internationalization and political and ideological interests of 
an autonomous foreign policy are central to the comprehension of the 
economic ties between Brazil and Angola. In this article, we will exam-
ine some of the main approaches to the role of the political dimension 
for business internationalization processes and analyse suggestions 
from literature about the changes in Brazilian foreign policy and its 
possible economic effects. The last step of this article is dedicated to 
8  The authors make a wide systematization of literature which binds the influence of politics 
relations on the economic flows, as investments.
9  The reduction of information asymmetries can also facilitate process of merger and acquisi-
tion, as it favors articulation between foreign and domestic actors.
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expose some of the data supporting the argument.
Brazilian relations with Angola
After a long period of low intensity relations, interaction with 
Lusophone Africa countries became more frequent. The creation of the 
Community of Portuguese Language Countries, in 1996, during the 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s government, is an important example 
of the evolution of the relations (Vigevani, Oliveira, and Cintra 2003). 
However, circumstances and intensity of the relations between Bra-
zil and African Countries would only change during Luis Inácio Lula 
da Silva administration. As pointed out by Visentini and Silva (2010), 
the change in government from Cardoso (1995 - 2002) to Lula (2003 
- 2010) represents a new chapter in terms of the importance of devel-
oping countries to the Brazilian Foreign Policy.
African countries represent possible strategic alliances to the 
country’s weight and aspirations in multilateral arenas as well oppor-
tunities for Brazilian market (Visentini and Silva 2010). These favour-
able characteristics have been better explored only during Lula’s gov-
ernment, to whom many attributes his own personal engagement in 
approaching Africa as an essential element of the strengthening bonds 
with these countries  (Visentini 2014; Oliveira 2015). During his gov-
ernment, Lula officially visited Angola three times (2003, 2007 and 
2010)10, signed 45 bilateral agreements with the country11 and has been 
an active interlocutor between South America and African Countries 
(e.g. IBAS and Africa-South America Summit). 
According to Barbosa et al. (2009), economy and politics are 
needed to understand the Brazilian foreign policy in Africa.  As report-
ed by the authors, opportunities for Brazilian exports and internation-
alization of firms influence Brazilian disposition to cooperation in the 
continent. However, from their point of view, the fact that Brazilian 
firms are continually going to Africa is not enough to say that Brazil is 
10  Having chosen to visit the country in its first year of government is indicative of the strategic 
importance that Angola now has for the government.
11   The data can be found in the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations database (http://dai-
mre.serpro.gov.br/)
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taking advantage as an emerging power in the area. There is still some 
regional dependence regarding China and USA in particular that put 
Brazil in a fragile position to exert geostrategic interests in the region.
A slightly different comprehension about the Brazilian pres-
ence in Africa is discussed by White (2010). To the author, the Brazil-
ian approach towards the Continent is relatively successful because it 
is based in the broad components. Combining (1) economic interests 
through the internationalization of its firms with (2) visits, strategic 
partnerships (e.g., IBSA) and (3) cooperation projects, Brazil reached to 
increase its influence as an emerging power in Africa. However, points 
the author, its position is still low in comparison to India and China. 
What differentiates Brazil presence from the Indian and Chinese is the 
plurality of actors involved and the mix of agencies, firms and govern-
mental actions. More than de facto presence, these characteristics im-
prove the Brazilian soft power in the continent, and assure a crescent 
good image. The consequences of this disposition can be seen in the 
frequent support from African countries to Brazilian positions in mul-
tilateral forums (White 2010). 
Among the African countries, Angola has a prominent role in 
Brazilian foreign policy. In 1975, after emancipation movements, Brazil 
was the first country to recognize the independence of Angola. Accord-
ing to Lima (2005), the recognition of the first Angolan independent 
government, during the Brazilian military government, is a landmark 
of Brazilian autonomous and active diplomacy in Africa (2005, 28). 
Nonetheless, the relationship only became more intense in the 1990s, 
with the visit of Fernando Henrique Cardoso to the region and the be-
ginning of trade negotiations between Brazil and the Mercosur with 
the SADC (Southern African Development Community)12. During Car-
doso’s government, sending military troops to a peace keeping mission 
in the country is considered by Vigevani et al. as a step towards the 
resumption of interest to Brazilian companies in the country (Vigevani, 
Oliveira and Cintra 2003, 55).
Angola has experienced high economic growth rates in the last 
decade. With an average economic growth of 10 % p.a. between 2001 
12  Composed by South Africa, Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe.
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and 201313, at income per capita Angola reached US$5.17 million in 
201314, owing to these factors the fifth largest African economy has re-
ceived attention from Brazilian companies. Due to business opportuni-
ties in critical areas to the country, such as oil and gas - which accounts 
for 46 % of its GDP and 96 % of its exports (World Bank, 2013) -, min-
ing, agriculture and infrastructure (Iglesias and Costa 2011) large Bra-
zilian companies had been easily seduced. With these characteristics, 
Angola has received Brazilian investments in the oil and construction 
sectors since the late 1970s (Iglesias and Costa 2011)15, and has become, 
in recent years, the main recipient of Brazilian investments in the con-
tinent (US$ 1.3 billion in 2013).
The attractiveness of the Angolan economy to Brazilian compa-
nies is also reflected in opportunities for exports. From 2001 to 2014, 
exports to the African country grew by more than 8 times16. For this 
reason, the country has become the second largest Brazilian trading 
partner in sub-Saharan Africa (Ministério das Relações Exteriores 
2013). The increase in the economic flows also affected Angola’s view 
about Brazil. According to Iglesias and Costa (2011, p.16), Brazil figures 
among the three most important countries in terms of relevance and 
influence17. 
The Brazilian trade model in Angola has as one of its foundations 
the financing guarantees of the National Bank for Economic and Social De-
velopment (BNDES) to finance exports of goods and infrastructure services. 
According to Vilas-Bôas (2014), Angola is not the only country to receive this 
type of guarantee, but it is the only country to have a special account for it (the 
“oil account”)18. The BNDES financing incentives for exports of goods and in-
13  The Angolan economy showed a growth rate of around 18% in 2006, 23% in 2007 and 14% 
in 2008. After the 2008 crisis, which affected oil prices and the inflow of FDI to the country, 
the growth has decreased. However, regained momentum in 2011 (4%) and in 7% in 2013.  
14  Compared to US $ 7.604 million, which is the average of upper-middle income in develop-
ing countries. Source: The World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-devel-
opment-indicators)
15  Petrobras started its operations in the country in 1979. Odebrecht begins its activities in 
Angola in 1984.
16  Which represent an amount of US$1,2 bi in 2014 (MDIC – Brazilian Ministry of Develop-
ment Industry and Trade).
17  Odebrecht is the biggest private employee of the country (Vieitas and Aboim 2012).
18  A especial report about the issue can be seen in Valor Econômico (02/05/2012). Accessed 
May 20, 2016. http://www.valor.com.br/brasil/2640008/brasil-quer-replicar-com-outros-pais-
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frastructure services in Angola has benefited, at least since 2007, some of the 
most important companies in the construction sector as Odebrecht, Camargo 
Correa, Queiroz Galvão and Andrade Gutierrez. While that consolidates the 
participation of Brazilian companies in the region, as suggested by Vilas-Bôas 
(2014), it is interesting to note that the main contractors of the engineering 
companies are governments. Thus, the construction companies in Angola, by 
reason of the oil account existence, have been directly benefited by the rela-
tions between the Angolan government and the Brazilian government.
Figure 2: Map of the distribution of Brazilian Foreign Direct Investments - 2014
Source: the authors. Based on data from Brazilian Central Bank. Light green (no or very 
low stock of FDI) – Dark green (high volume of capital stock)
Political determinants of brazilian Investments in developing 
countries
Foreign investment in general, and the internationalization of com-
panies, in particular, are objects of study in various areas of the humanities 
and are even the basis of an area of knowledge, the so-called international 
business19. Although the international business area has no exclusivity on the 
issue, the field is common reference for most researchers. It is from the de-
es-da-africa-modelo-de-comercio-com-angola 
19  The area holds a broad debate on the issues and has researchers of different fields, such as 
Administration, Economics, Political Science, International Relations, Sociology, Anthropolo-
gy and Psychology.
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bate in the area that the main explanatory theories about the trajectories, strat-
egies, causes and effects of internationalization are formulated.
The most common way of understanding the internationalization of 
Brazilian companies is considering it as a later step to exports. In situations 
where certain markets have significant  share in company’s exports, to open 
subsidiaries, representative offices and / or technical assistance are natural 
steps (CNI 2013, 45). Among other explanations often cited as reasons for the 
internationalization of Brazilian companies are the diversification of strate-
gies and minimization of risks in relation to Brazil’s economic cycle (Hiratu-
ka and Sarti 2011)), access to new technologies (Arbix, Salerno, and Negri 
2005), reduction of costs and learning to cope with international competition 
(Cyrino and Tanure 2009), the improvement in macro and microeconomic 
domestic environment (Casanova and Kassum 2013) and the incentives and 
financing schemes of host countries (Caseiro 2013).
As soon as examples of companies internationalization from devel-
oping countries began to proliferate, the main explanatory approaches about 
the determinants of internationalization started to be questioned about their 
suitability for emerging markets contexts (Cuervo-Cazurra and Ramamurti 
2014; Cuervo-Cazurra 2012). Although disseminated, this kind of explanation 
is subject to controversy. The authors working with the Uppsala model, in 
which the Brazilian investments abroad are seen as a result of gradual strat-
egies began to be questioned much because of the profile that Brazilian in-
vestments took from 2004 on (Arbix and Caseiro 2011; Casanova and Kassum 
2013)20. In the opinion of Arbix and Caseiro (2012), recent governmental pol-
icies to internationalization altered the strategies of Brazilian multinationals. 
Among the explanations provided by the authors, there is the state support 
for the creation of large business groups, the national champions. The public 
support via institutions such as the BNDES intensified the internationaliza-
tion of Brazilian companies and has been essential to the creation of large and 
competitive multinationals.
The new approaches emphasize innovative strategies of market en-
trance (Mathews 2006), the skills developed to deal with institutional envi-
ronments  uncertainties (Guillén and García-Canal 2009), the comparative 
advantages derived from the country context (Fleury, Fleury, and Borini 2013; 
Rugman and Verbeke 2004) and adaptation strategies that value specific ad-
vantages and at the same time reduce the liabilities of being foreigner (Ra-
20  For these researchers, the companies first settle in neighboring countries (Latin America) 
and then proceed to more remote areas (Fleury, Fleury, and Borini 2013; Parente et al. 2013). 
These explanations are based, as a rule, in the argument that the cultural and geographical 
proximity reduces the risk of business investments.
Pietro Carlos de Souza Rodrigues, Sonia Delindro Gonçalves
245
mamurti and Singh 2009). Looking at the origin context of emerging mul-
tinationals brought to attention the role of institutions in business decisions 
(Kostova and Zaheer 1999; Kostova 2002), enlarging the political dimensions 
considered important to the international behaviour of firms. This and other 
aspects cited have been incorporated to international business studies, albeit 
it is still very detained to the incentives and relations between companies and 
bureaucracies in origin and host countries.
The Brazilian literature of international relations has given increas-
ing attention to the role played by Brazilian transnational corporations in 
the international insertion of Brazil (Jank and Tachinardi 2007; Sennes and 
Mendes 2009)21. On many occasions, partnerships between the Brazilian 
government and firms succeed to increase the international presence of the 
country by promoting the expansion of the productive activities of Brazilian 
companies abroad. 
Public incentives for internationalization are often linked to pro-
grams of cooperation for international development in regions in which the 
country seeks to increase its influence22. The internationalization of public 
corporations and national research institutions like Embrapa, Fiocruz, Sabe-
sp, among others, seems to be encouraged through incentives generated from 
technical cooperation projects promoted by the Brazilian Cooperation Agen-
cy23 (Barbosa 2012). In general, these programs seek to replicate the nation-
al expertise in projects in the areas of sanitation, agricultural development 
and housing construction - knowledge which many developing countries can 
benefit by taking advantage of the experience gained by these companies in 
Brazil.
In regional integration issues, the internationalization of Brazilian 
companies is often encouraged by the government in order to strengthen 
its regional presence from large projects. Private companies in the area of 
infrastructure, as important Brazilian construction companies - Odebrecht, 
Camargo Correa, Andrade and Gutierrez and Queiroz Galvão, to name some 
21  Examples in literature (Alem and Cavalcanti 2005; Alves 2011; Campielo and Pesavento 
2013; Carvalho 2012; Iglecias 2011; Menezes 2012; Vasconcellos 2014; Vianna 2010; Caseiro e 
Masiero 2014).
22  See (Guimarães 2001; Sennes and Mendes 2009)
23  Example is the Pro-Savana program, in which the Brazilian government (through the Bra-
zilian Cooperation Agency in partnership with Embrapa) seeks to develop agricultural produc-
tion in savannah areas in Africa based on the successful adaptation of the “Cerrado”, a kind of 
biome found in the Center-West of Brazil (which has similar conditions to African savannas). 
The potential of this program, in addition to externalities for some African economies, could 
result in investment opportunities for entrepreneurs of Brazilian agribusiness sector.
See: http://www.cnpmf.embrapa.br/destaques/Mocambique.pdf 
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the most known - are important agents in projects related to regional energy 
integration, infrastructure, logistics and transport (Castro 2012; Couto 2008; 
Luxemburg 2009; Vasconcellos 2014; Vilas-Bôas 2011). Other domestic com-
panies are part of the group benefited by the Brazilian government in these 
areas, as are examples Petrobras and Vale do Rio Doce.
Also in strategic areas for the national development as the technolo-
gy-intensive industry, the Brazilian government’s actions have fulfilled an im-
portant role in the internationalization of Brazilian companies (Arbix, Saler-
no, and Negri 2005). Those with a high degree of technological expertise and 
innovation potential as Embraer, Marcopolo, Weg and Braskem are supported 
by government institutions24. The aim is to obtain access to knowledge and 
technology, while ensuring the competitive insertion of Brazilian companies 
in these sectors. The international presence of these companies ensures the 
Brazilian government participation in strategic global markets in the areas of 
security and defence, transportation, energy, among others.
As pointed out, Brazil has put forward institutions to promote Bra-
zilian trade and investments overseas, such as the Brazilian Export and In-
vestment Promotion (APEX) and the National Bank for Economic and Social 
Development (BNDES) that occupy essential roles in support the internation-
alization of Brazilian companies25.
It is in the interest of the business community that the Brazilian gov-
ernment establishes agreements in search of investment opportunities and 
credible commitments for Brazilian investments abroad, with particular at-
tention to its role in developing and planned economy countries (CNI 2013). 
From businesses point of view, in addition to the guarantees of ownership and 
property rights, the advantages created by the Brazilian government presence 
may represent real market opportunities. Obtaining operational permissions 
and access to knowledge, technologies and strategic assets can be facilitated to 
Brazilian companies depending on the kind of presence the Brazilian govern-
ment has established with the investment host country. In particular, techno-
logical development agreements and technical cooperation can promote the 
activities of Brazilian companies, increasing their competitiveness or mean-
24  Sometimes BNDES is a shareholder of these companies. Case studies about the trajectories 
of internationalization of them can be seen in (Parente et al. 2013)
25  The "Report of the Brazilian Investments Abroad 2013" organized by National Industry 
Confederation (CNI) prescribes some desirable attributes of being adopted by the Brazilian 
government in order to promote the internationalization of companies. Among the recom-
mendations are: a) the coordination of investment promotion initiatives (economic diplomacy); 
b) the defense of the interests of Brazilian companies in relation to governments of host coun-
tries (especially in developing countries) and c) the negotiation of agreements to promote and 
protect investments (BITs) in order to mitigate political risks (CNI 2013, 12).
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ing privileged business opportunities.
Brazilian Foreign Policy and Investments in Angola
Understood as political risks for investments, the possibilities for dis-
cretionary actions of countries are linked to the characteristics of their politi-
cal and institutional environment. Such practices and decisions can occur due 
to the diffuse understanding about the impacts of foreign investment (Jensen 
and Lindstädt 2013), and they may be related to institutional quality indicators 
(Buchanan, Le, and Rishi 2012). Political risks, according to Henisz (2000), 
impact the decision of going abroad and the entrance mode of companies in 
a country, and “is a function not just of the structure of the institutional envi-
ronment but also of the characteristics of the investment” (2000, 335). When 
going to places where institutional uncertainties are high, as in Angola, po-
litical connections and international agreements between governments may 
have an important function in diminishing political risks (Büthe and Milner 
2012; Guerin and Manzocchi 2009; Jensen 2008)26. Domestic institutions 
are important for attracting FDI (Jensen 2003) and inconsistencies in attract-
ing investments may occur due to lack of investor guarantees that the govern-
ments will not undertake measures that affect them negatively (Büthe and 
Milner 2012, 35) as are examples the forced nationalization of companies, tax-
ing profit remittances, corruption, among others (Busse and Hefeker 2007; 
Xu and Shenkar 2002)27. In addition, according to Schneider and Frey (1985), 
the ideological affinity of recipient and origin governments can change var-
iable costs for business, encouraging the flows of investments between the 
countries as it facilitates the opening of communication channels, promotes 
cooperation between the parties and reduces information asymmetries.28
From the many suggestions in the literature about how the policy 
choices of countries affect the investment and trade provision of national 
companies and observing the behaviour of some Brazilian companies in Afri-
ca, we argue that this kind of relation is a central part of the internationaliza-
26  According to Buthe and Milner (2012), the more democratic a country is, the greater is 
the effect of preferential agreements and free trade agreements on the level of investments re-
ceived by the country. Similar explanation is found in the works of Tuman and Emmert (2004), 
for whom firms seeking to expand market may be attracted to a country when it participates in 
regional free trade agreements or custom unions.
27  Types of political risks are better detailed by Henisz (2000).
28  In the Brazilian case, as interpreted by Vigevani and Cepaluni (2007), the "experience of 
Lula da Silva government suggests a significant weight of ideas, tempered by the constraints of 
international realities - political, economic and strategic” (p. 276).
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tion of Brazilian firms in Angola. A series of descriptive data on investments, 
trade, cooperation projects and BNDES support to companies operating in 
Angola corroborates the argument of economic gains encouraged by govern-
ment incentives and the policy actions taken by the Brazilian foreign policy, 
the so called South-South cooperation29.
According to a survey from Dom Cabral Foundation (2014), 12 of the 
100 most transnationalized Brazilian companies operate in Angola. Among 
them, at least 7 are from the construction sector and are subject to receive 
special indirect benefits from the Brazilian government. The Development 
Bank (BNDES) counts with a special line of credit to foreign clients to buy 
services from Brazilian companies and it has benefited largely some of the 
most important firms in the construction sector. The BNDES financing data 
on exports of engineering services and capital goods show that, from 2007 
to 2014, Angola was the country that most received the modality. Among the 
benefited companies, Queiroz Galvão, Andrade Gutierrez, Camargo Correa 
and, especially, Odebrecht can be listed and are present in the country since 
the 1980s.
Figure 3: BNDES disbursement by firm, year and country
Source: the authors. Based on data from BNDES (2015).
 
The list of the top countries that are preferred destinations of BNDES 
benefits does not reflect the role of political and ideological affinities between 
29  The assumption that the BNDES financing are indicative of governmental proximity to the 
country, exports destination of goods and services is presumed here.
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the Brazilian government and partner countries. One way to verify this con-
nection is ascertaining the alignment on international issues of these econo-
mies with regard to Brazil. Among the works  seeking to find similarities and 
proximities between countries from the positions taken in international bod-
ies, stands out the voting pattern of the representatives at the United Nations 
General Assembly (Gartzke 2000; Voeten 2012). 
Because of its broad scope, alignment from the votes in the UNGA 
is often considered a good indicator of affinity between countries30. Examples 
in the Brazilian foreign policy literature are relevant. Amorim Neto (2011) 
evaluates the relative weight of domestic and systemic political variables in 
determining the Brazilian foreign policy. Particularly, it is in the interest of 
the author to demonstrate how the convergence of votes between Brazil and 
the United States at the United Nations General Assembly is a good indicator 
of changes in the direction of Brazilian foreign policy over time. Similarly, 
Malamud (2011) asses in what extent Brazil is a regional power using the 
UNGA votes as a proxy to evaluate the adherence of countries in the region to 
the Brazilian positions. Ramanzini and Ribeiro (Ramanzini and Ribeiro 2013) 
compare the convergence of Brazil and China to some of their key strategic 
partners. The authors’ findings strengthen the hypothesis that the political 
alignment between Brazil and China is followed by the increase in trade and 
investment relations between the countries.
Figure 4: Votes Convergence in the UNGA (2001 - 2012)
Source: the Authors. Data from Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten (2015). 
As we can see in the figure above, Angola had a high alignment with 
Brazil in relation to the pattern of votes in the UNGA between the years of 
30  These data was summarized and made available to the public by Erik Voeten, and they are 
available on the Harvard Dataverse Network (https://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/).
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2001 and 2012. This alignment is similar to that of other countries that are 
also common destinations of BNDES export incentives, namely, Argentina, 
Cuba and Venezuela. Analysing more precisely the variation of the conver-
gence in the UNGA between Angola and Brazil, it is possible to see that in the 
period between 2006 and 2010 the alignment reached its peak. Coincidental-
ly, this was also the period of growth of [1] the number of cooperation projects 
between Brazil and Angola, [2] the volume of disbursement from BNDES 
which benefited Brazilian companies and [3] the volume of Brazilian exports 
to the country. Also, it comprises the period in which Lula da Silva made three 
official visits to the country (2003, 2007 and 2010).
Figure 5: Number of Cooperation projects, BNDES disbursement, Brazilian FDI 
and Exports to Angola (2001 - 2014)
Source: the authors. Used data from Aid Data 3.0, BNDES, Brazilian Central Bank and 
Brazilian Ministry of Development, Industry and Trade (MDIC).
Preliminary statistical tests suggest a positive relationship between 
the variables- a relation that is even greater when considering the investment 
and trade variables lagged. The results were not brought here by the absence 
of more robust data able to allow any suggestions of causality. However, a 
simple correlation test points out the values  of 0.67 between cooperation 
(projcoop) and votes in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 0.87 
between exports and cooperation and 0.80 between the votes in the UNGA 
and the financing of exports provided by BNDES. Although we are avoiding to 
presenting more elaborate theories about the effects of Brazilian cooperation 
over the flow of Brazilian investments in Angola, it is plausible to argue that 
the Brazilian economic activity in Angola, partly captured by the FDI and by 
the exports is related to major political events involving both countries. In the 
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case of exports, there is a clear relation between the increase of the Brazilian 
foreign policy activities (official visits, UNGA votes and cooperation projects) 
and the increase in exports. 
Although this relationship is not clear in the case of the investments, 
it is reasonable to interpret that the Brazilian companies in Angola benefit 
from the actions of Brazilian foreign policy, especially large groups of engi-
neering. If we consider the exports of services as a signal of direct activity of 
firms in Angola, it is clear that the stimulus provided by the BNDES works as 
a fundamental mechanism of connection between the Brazilian government 
and the host client, which is in this case mainly the Angolan government. The 
firms, the final beneficiaries of this relationship, by its chance, strengthen 
the Brazilian presence in the country. The causality is not clear, but these ev-
idences may show us that there is a complementarity between governmental 
and private interests behind the Brazil and Angola bilateral relations in the 
last years.
Final Remarks
When dealing with Brazilian investments in Africa, Souza (2012) sug-
gests that the Brazilian development cooperation has contributed to financing 
the exports of goods and services, especially through incentives promoted by 
the BNDES. The evidences here presented meet with the author’s view and 
point out that between 2001 and 2014, Brazilian companies have benefited 
not only from cooperation for development, but also from a broader politi-
cal relation between the governments. The behavior of Angola and Brazil in 
the United Nations General Assembly, the number of cooperation projects 
signed between the countries, presidential visits, and public incentives as the 
BNDES credit line for exports, corroborates the argument that the economic 
benefits of Brazilian companies are associated to international political align-
ment of the countries.
The quest for autonomy as a primary objective of the orientation of 
Brazilian foreign policy - in which policies are oriented around the South-
South cooperation as opposed to the hegemonic parameter of North-South 
cooperation - can induce external behavior of Brazilian companies. The inter-
twining between foreign policy and internationalization strategies of Brazil-
ian companies can be seen as an important drive for the operation of Brazil-
ian firms in developing countries, and in particular in Angola.
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ABSTRACT
The literature has given increasing attention to the role played by Brazilian 
transnational companies in its international insertion. In this context, special 
attention has been given to Brazilian private activities in Africa and, in particular, in 
Angola. Some countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are understood as potential markets 
for investments, especially given the similarities of the challenges for development 
and expertise of some of the Brazilian firms in sectors as agriculture, mining and civil 
construction. The objective of this paper is to try to capture possible relations between 
Brazil-Angola bilateral relations over the international operations of Brazilian firms. 
Our argument is that the business environment to investments has been favoured by 
a simultaneous international political alignment, as a consequence of the changes in 
the Brazilian foreign policy orientation.
KEYWORDS
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